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Introduction: A View from the Bench
JUDGE JESSE E. ESCHBACH*

The authors of the articles which appear in this Symposium are
able, concerned members of the federal judiciary; concerned, and to an
extent frustrated that the judicial power as exercised by individual
judges cannot itself rectify the failures of our judicial system which increasingly cry out for public awareness and congressional response.
The causes are many: among others, too few judgeships, too many cases,
too broad a jurisdictional base, too many legislatively created causes
without evaluation of the impact on the judicial machinery, and failure
to recognize the impact of inadequate judicial compensation on the
retention and attraction of competent judges. But whichever issue may
serve as a focal point, the ultimate problem is that civil litigants can
no longer expect that their cause will be determined speedily before a
judge, drawn from the highest ranks of the legal profession, who has
had the time to apply his expertise to the thorny legal and factual questions which constantly arise.
The sentiments expressed in this Symposium are not altogether new.
It will not be seriously disputed that "the duty of lawyers and the
function of judges is to deliver the best quality of justice at the least
cost in the shortest time."' Ironically, the measures necessary to alleviate
the problems are themselves beyond the power of the courts to achieve,
for such questions as the scope of federal jurisdiction and the qualification and compensation of judges must be answered by society generally
and by Congress in particular.
Not merely in theology does the image of rebirth give structure to
the process of transformation by which the old is both replaced and
retained. So also Lincoln could remind us at Gettysburg that the transformation by which the individual states that day again became a
nation required a rededication to, and a rebirth of, the "old" constitutional values. This bicentennial year provides an appropriate time to
take measure of our federal judicial system. Indeed, as Judge Renfrew
notes, "it is a time of desperate need for direction, clarification and
* Chief judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.
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improvement." 2 Sentencing, outmoded grounds for federal civil jurisdiction, shortages of judicial manpower, disparity between incomes of
judges and those of the practicing bar, potentially inadequate removal
mechanisms, and perhaps even the politically oriented method by which
judges are selected are matters of immediate concern. These are issues
not merely of academic interest; they are issues which vitally affect
every citizen, for each citizen has the right to expect that justice be
swift, that it be administered as inexpensively as possible, and-most
importantly-that the courts be dispensers of justice and not mere
processors of cases.
Congressional response, unfortunately, has been inadequate. Indeed,
recent practice has been to superimpose litigation priorities on the existing overburden. Examples include the Speedy Trial Act' and the priority
provisions of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.' The objectives
of such legislation are commendable, but this observation does not end
the inquiry. Something more must be accomplished. Surely all cases
deserve expeditious handling; failure to legislate a super-priority for
other classes sub silentio institutionalizes a policy of delay inconsistent
with the premise that justice delayed is justice denied. Judge Bratton's
suggestion that diversity jurisdiction be pared away represents but a
proposal to do directly what the various priority rules seem to accomplish indirectly.
Judge Bratton's arguments become all the more compelling when
one realizes that not only do diversity cases unnecessarily "clog" the
courts' calendars, thus diverting judicial energies from matters cognizable only in federal court, but even now the promise of diversity
jurisdiction itself often goes unfulfilled. The very congestion that diversity cases help create makes it difficult for courts to give those cases
the time or reflection that these problems of state law or conflicts of
law demand. In short, if there must be diversity jurisdiction, it ought
to be extended only under such conditions that the federal court's Erie
obligations can be intelligently met.
Proposals for change ought not be based solely on caseload data.
Certainly such data are relevant, as Judge Bratton's article demonstrates.
And sophisticated techniques for predicting the growth of caseloads
are being developed, whereby the federal trial courts' rate of descent
into the morass of their own caseload can be pinpointed with even
2
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greater accuracy.; But caseload is relevant only because it reflects upon
a judge's ability to devote sufficient time to each case, to appraise each
litigant's position, and to reflect upon each counsel's brief. Briefs need
to be studied, not just read in haste. Certainly justice must be swift,
but it ought not be hasty. That justice may be swiftly dispensed does
not ensure that justice will be properly dispensed. The recent habit of
equating "justice" primarily with quantity needs reexamination.
The articles by Judges Marovitz, Sprecher, and Wallace identify other criteria by which the quality of justice may be assessed.
Each speaks to judicial competence: Judge Marovitz offers proposals
relating to subject matter competence, Judge Sprecher points to the
problem of attracting qualified attorneys to the bench, and retaining
them once there, and Judge Wallace is concerned with the need for
proper and constitutional removal mechanisms. If speedy adjudication
is the sole object of the judicial system, then none of these judges can
be correct in his concern for informed and able decisionmakers. Nor
can administrative innovation overcome the type of judicial mediocrity
which Judge Sprecher warns against. Judge Marovitz's proposals, Judge
Hastings' discussion of the Seventh Circuit's publication policies, and
the proposed intermediate court of appeals analyzed by Judge Swygert
may provide stopgap assistance in limited areas, but as is well discussed elsewhere6 all such administrative innovations cannot preserve
the excellence of the federal trial courts in the face of existing and
predicted per judge caseloads. As noted in that study,7 more judgeships must be created. And as Judge Sprecher rightly explains, the
benefits of office must be such that these new judgeships will be filled
with the ablest of attorneys, else the reduction in caseload will not increase the quality of justice dispensed.
The growth of reliance upon judicial decisionmaking within this
century has been immense. Perhaps there is a subtle assumption that
only judicial participation can ensure the due process of law;" perhaps
it is also that society increasingly seeks to ascribe to the disinterested
judge the additional role of national statesman. To those not already
familiar with him, Judge Renfrew reflects in his article that he is
among those jurists prepared to accept this added role. A judge sensitive
to the awesome responsibility of sentencing the convicted must pause
5 See
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at Judge Renfrew's profound introductory paragraph. His proposals for
amending Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure can be
effective, however, only if federal judges are given the time to fulfill
their duties in as conscientious a manner as Judge Renfrew proposes.
Those who read these Symposium articles cannot help but be impressed with the immediacy of the problems facing our judicial process.
It is now time to revitalize the system, to clarify our goals, and to
establish realistic and practicable means of attaining those goals. That
these articles need be written at all by the learned authors is a matter
for concern, and for frustration.

